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The Perils of Seduction:
Intervention From the Other End
by
Timothy J. Lomperis
PROLOGUE
At this writing, the storm clouds of military intervention build in North
America over the “grave and gathering danger” in Iraq, a half-world away.  In
his speech to the UN on 12 September warning of this danger, President George
Bush demanded that Iraq end its threat to world order by eliminating all its
weapons of mass destruction.  He also insisted that the government in Baghdad
stop oppressing its minority populations and open itself up to democratic
reforms.1
The clouds of this “gathering intervention” are a lethal admixture of two
levels or arenas of politics: the imperatives of international order under girded
by the foreign policies of “supervising” great powers and the disorders roiling
up from societies of unstable, weak, and volatile states.  Dangers lurk in this
admixture.  The United States, as one of these supervisory great powers, has had
frequent opportunity to discover this: at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba, in the long
nightmare of the Vietnam War, in a blown-up Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983,
during the sharp war in the Persian Gulf in 1991, and in a “Black Hawk down”
in the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993.  More recently, in the break-away
Serbian province of Kosovo in 1999, Washington, in its desire to staunch the
internationally disordering flow of Kosovar refugees, was pulled into serving as
the air force for the local Kosovo Liberation Army, whose local separatist polit-
ical ambitions were at odds with the integrationist international objectives of the
United States.2
As a guide to the wary, this article seeks to elucidate the political dangers
emanating from the often murky levels of the domestic politics of target states to
the international political intentions of those supervisory powers who contem-
plate pulling interventionist triggers.
Timothy J. Lomperis is Professor and Chair of the Department of Political
Science at Saint Louis University.
Fall 2002
6
INTRODUCTION   
Interventions come as much from seduction as they do from rape.  Anyway
you look at them, military interventions to alter or forcibly preserve the domes-
tic political arrangements or foreign policies of client or target states are viola-
tions of sovereignty.  Sovereignty is the foundational presupposition of the par-
adigm of an international system centrally composed of mutually sovereign
nation-states.  Foreign military interventions, for whatever reasons, are clear vio-
lations of this principle and confront this paradigm of individually sovereign, but
collectively anarchic, nation-states with anomalies serious enough to overthrow
it.3 Interventions, nevertheless, have been frequent, if not quite commonplace.
In order to preserve the fundamental respect for this principle’s survival, inter-
ventions by great powers in the affairs of smaller ones have always been justi-
fied by exceptionalist rhetoric.
The rape-versus-seduction metaphor that I have chosen follows in this
exceptionalist language.  Interventions are not routine.  A system based on a
mutual respect for sovereignty puts any intervention in at least some posture of
disrespect.  Neither rapes nor seductions are accepted ways of conducting inter-
personal relations.  The metaphor also illustrates a tension.  Interventions are var-
iously perceived:  as a rape, perhaps, by at least some elements in the target soci-
ety, or as a possible ambush of seduction from the vantage point of the interven-
er.  These two perspectives are what Richard Little calls “push” and “pull” expla-
nations of intervention.4
The “push” explanation refers to international factors propelling interven-
tions.  That is, interventions arise from foreign policy goals of great powers that
seek to either bolster or alter the internal political arrangements of target states
to bring these arrangements and their foreign policies in line with the interna-
tional position of the intervening powers.  Here the interventions, whatever else
they are doing, are forcing their will on the target states, and, at least to those ele-
ments in these societies who resist, the interventions are rapes.  Though sliding
from “push” to “rape” may constitute something of a rhetorical stretch, the rape
metaphor has the analytical utility of underscoring the fact that any forcible inter-
vention will carry a built-in problem of legitimacy.
The “pull” explanation points to factors within weaker states that attract
outside interventions.  Though these factors may seem to provide compelling
reasons for outside “assistance,” the core of a pull explanation rests in domestic
political interests within target states that see foreign interventions as advancing
their own goals at least as much as, if not more than, those of the obliging, and
perhaps unsuspecting, intervening powers.  These powers, then, are seduced into
fulfilling the objectives of the ostensibly feeble target states.
Though not a favorite metaphor among statesmen and scholars of inter-
vening states, most of the literature on intervention views it from the perspective
of the pushy explanation of rape.  That is, the concerns of interventions are exam-
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ined fairly exclusively from the calculations of the interveners:  the costs and
benefits to them, and their own capabilities and limitations in undertaking such
enterprises.  What is again apt about the rape metaphor is that rapists, by defini-
tion, do not see their actions too empathetically from the perspective of their vic-
tims.  The self-absorbed considerations of the rapists are so paramount that they
are not willing to grant their victims even the right to a point of view, let alone
recognize that the victims are capable of manipulating the interventions them-
selves to their own advantage.  If sex is interactive and rape is not, rapists fail to
appreciate that their military interventions are also interactive political deeds.
Despite Little’s insistence that interventions are best understood in the ten-
sion between push and pull explanations,5 I will show that the weight of the lit-
erature on intervention lies heavily with the push perspective, and briefly demon-
strate that this literature has largely and shortsightedly ignored the view of inter-
ventions from the other end:  the pull explanation whereby interventions can also
be seductions.  My thesis is that the richer insights lie in the more subtle expla-
nations of seduction.  For policymakers, these bottom-up explanations allow
interveners to elude many of the ambushes hidden by top-down deductive trea-
tises.  To be sure, interventions are not solely due to “push” or “pull” factors, but
occur in an environmental mix of both.  No case, then, will neatly fall into sepa-
rate categories of “push” (rape) or “pull” (seduction) because interventions
involve at least two parties who have two political perspectives and sets of cal-
culations.  My basic point, however, is that the politics “from the other end,” the
lower or domestic end of the target state, are too often under-appreciated.
Rape
In the Western world, Prince Metternich of Austria offered one of the first
top-down or “push” justifications of interventions.  He argued that, in fashioning
a balance-of-power international system, great power “supervision” of lesser
powers might be occasionally necessary to ensure that the “repose” of the sys-
tem itself would not be disturbed.6 The United States later relied on a justifica-
tion similar to that when it frequently intervened in weak Central American states
to preclude European interventions that might disturb the repose of the Monroe
Doctrine.  The Cold War continued this top-down perspective under the rubric of
the Containment Doctrine that sought to create a global repose of anti-commu-
nism.  As Robert Packenham pointed out, the American objectives in the Third
World were obsessed by these security concerns, despite rhetoric that seemed to
promote economic development and political democracy.7 This, to D. Michael
Shafer, set up a “deadly paradigm” of “contentless universalism.”8
When the Korean War (1950-53) ended without resorting to nuclear
weapons, but also far short of victory, a literature developed on “limited war.”
Once this literature decided that limited war did not mean tactical nuclear war
short of a full strategic nuclear exchange,9 but rather military interventions
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employing strictly conventional means for politically circumscribed objectives,
it became a literature of fairly prescient warnings.  In acknowledging what
Secretary of State George Shultz later called “ambiguous warfare,” Robert
Osgood pointed out that the very difficulty of these interventions could make
them become protracted, and he worried whether the American political system
had the patience for such engagements.  Osgood, in brief, was not sure that “lim-
ited war” was a good idea.10
Alexander George thought that not all of it was bad, only some of it.  In his
Limits to Coercive Diplomacy, for example, he argued that interventions were of
two types:  those that prevented a deed only contemplated by an adversary (Type
A), and those that had to undo something that had already been done (Type B).
Naturally, Type B was much harder to do, and should be avoided, whereas Type
A, since it was pre-emptive, was given a green light by George.  The fact that
perhaps these interventions were more complicated than this neat dichotomy
suggested was ironically illustrated by George’s own examples.  For Type A, he
approvingly cited Kennedy’s dispatch of 5,000 US marines to Northeast
Thailand in 1961 to successfully dissuade the Pathet Lao from overrunning Laos.
He used the Cuban Missiles Crisis for Type B to stress both the dangers and dif-
ficulties of forcing a strategic reversal on an adversary.11 What is confusing
about these examples is that, whatever the theoretical point, George’s Type A
example was an ultimate historical failure and his Type B illustration was
America’s most ringing Cold War triumph.
Nevertheless, the major point of this literature was still well taken.  It was
Alexander Mack who said it best. “Big nations lose small wars,” he observed,
because they can never give them their “all,” since other global responsibilities
keep great powers perennially distracted.  Since, from the perspective of the
smaller target state, this “limited war” (to the outsider) is the total arena of their
national life, they will be much more focused in this engagement and more like-
ly to marshal all their available resources.    There is, then, an asymmetry of will
that frequently permit the smaller and weaker power to win.12 The asymmetry
of will stems from the fact that “big nations,” with far-flung global interests and
commitments, are playing many games at once and cannot permit one game to
draw away too many of their pieces in this multi-gamed global chess board. If
this happens, peer competitors to the big power are likely to take advantage of
this with provocative actions in areas left uncovered by this distraction.  As
examples, in both the Bay of Pigs in 1961 and the Cuban missiles crisis a year
later, President Kennedy felt constrained in Cuba by his fears that the Soviet
Union would retaliate with horizontal escalation in Berlin.13 In sum, this litera-
ture on limited war was certainly not lacking in insights, but they were insights
that lacked particularistic detail.  There were some good general principles, to be
sure, but the truths that came from details on the ground were lacking.
The subsequent literature on counterinsurgency should have been better.
Roger Hilsman, the ex-Merrill’s-Marauder-turned-New Frontiersman, intro-
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duced America to insurgency in his lengthy Foreword to an English translation
of General Vo Nguyen Giap’s People’s War, People’s Army.14 Giap’s tract pro-
vided an account of his stunning triumph at Dienbienphu in 1954 in a straight
Maoist people’s war framework.  The Kennedy administration girded itself for
this new Cold War challenge of “brush fire wars” with its own new strategy of
“flexible response.”15 A suitable literature quickly developed that analytically
broke apart insurgencies into laundry lists of stages and typologies with a set of
countermeasures to match each stage and block each type.16 But all this care-
fully scripted balancing and counterbalancing became too straight jacketed in its
formularies to bring the nuanced politics on the ground into focus.  In the end,
the analysis remained on a too general, deductive level.17
Seduction
While “push” factors of balance-of-power policies, limited war goals
assessments, and counterinsurgency strategies and techniques do have insights to
offer, none of these approaches proved fine-grained enough to bring the perils
and pitfalls of local political contexts into view.  A strategy of flexible response
was still not supple enough to avoid a “quagmire” in Vietnam.18 Appreciating
Maoist insurgency strategy was not enough to keep up with the perilously mer-
curial Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia.  Despite his exasperating ways,
he still held the keys to Cambodian political legitimacy, even as all the second-
choice fallback clients, seized upon by the Americans, did not.19 Relying on the
disastrous deductive assumption that since, by definition, communism was
unpopular, President Kennedy was persuaded to believe that all that was neces-
sary to ignite a massive popular uprising against Castro’s Cuba in 1961 was to
insert a mercenary brigade of Cuban exiles along the coast.  In so doing, the “vol-
unteers” were stopped cold in a regurgitation known as the Bay of Pigs fiasco.20
In all these cases, and many others, a greater penetration into local politics would
have triggered flashes of warning.
Not only are these politics difficult to penetrate, they can also shift dra-
matically, and alter the terms and target of the local sirens of seduction.  A par-
ticularly vivid case of these local politics as a stimulus or pull of intervention was
Ethiopia in the summer of 1991.  The Ethiopian regime of General Mengistu was
supported by the Soviet Union.  The collapse of the Soviet Union tempted the
Tigray Peoples Liberation Front and the Eritrean separatist movement to move
in for the kill on the capital city of Addis Ababa.  As they advanced on the capi-
tal, all three groups pronounced their undying loyalty to their respective foreign
benefactors:  the regime to Moscow, the Eritreans to their Cuban advisers, and
the Tigrayans to the inspiration of Albanian Maoism.  Just at this inopportune
moment, however, these three benefactors collapsed.21 Not skipping a beat, the
Tigrayans, as they marched through the streets of Addis Ababa the moment that
Albania’s Maoism succumbed to capitalism, switched their rhetoric, mid-sen-
tence, from the triumph of Maoist people’s war to effusive admiration of
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Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address.22 Here was the politics of seduction nakedly
revealed, as Washington suddenly found itself supporting the new regime’s claim
for support in the interests of regional stability, a mantra always pleasing to
American ears. 
These two cases of the Bay of Pigs in 1961 and Ethiopia in 1991 illustrate
the fact that interventions by seduction are at least of two types.  Ethiopia is an
example of outright seduction in which local political groups lure an outside
power into an intervention for their own local purposes, purposes usually unbe-
known to the hapless “victim.”  Similar instances are America’s “humanitarian”
intervention in Somalia in 1992 succumbing to other purposes in Mogadishu, and
perhaps, in a global Samsonesque temple of a crash of civilizations, Osama bin
Laden struck his blows on 11 September as a grand, provocative “sucker play.”
The Bay of Pigs, on the other hand, is an example of seduction by pitfalls
of quicksand.  In this case, the intervener is tempted by the apparent weakness of
the target society and the inviting opportunity it presents to this intervener of
securing an easy advantage for its global purposes.  The usual scenario is to wit-
ness a lightning attempt at a coup de main turn into a debacle, as in the Bay of
Pigs, or deteriorate into a quagmire of protracted conflict with a tar baby, as in
Vietnam.23 These blows are stimulated by the top-down perception of weakness
and vulnerability.  This, of course, sets up the seductive target for interveners
who, once on the ground, fall into a thigh-lock grip of political complexities.
Indeed, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned the enthusiastic civilian planners of
the Bay of Pigs invasion: “Ultimate success will depend upon political factors.”24
Ethiopia as Outright Seduction
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Horn of Africa lay prostrate in the
deathly embrace of famine, poverty, and violence.  Civil wars raged in Sudan and
Somalia.  Five insurgencies plagued Ethiopia and Eritrea.  The region was the
poorest in the world.  Per capita incomes in 1987 were $130 per year in Ethiopia,
$290 in Somalia, and $330 in Sudan.  This latter figure represented the overall
average for the slightly more developed sub-Saharan Africa.25 But it was not the
poverty that concerned Washington so much as it was the huge Soviet, Cuban,
and even East German presence and influence.  With Soviet military support of
one billion dollars per year, the Marxist government of Ethiopia had built up an
army of 350,000, the largest in Africa.26 Supporting this build-up were 16,000
regular troops from Cuba and 2,000 Soviet military advisers.27 On top of all this,
to the further frustration of Washington, the dominant insurgent groups also
spouted Marxist-Leninist ideologies.  Somewhat quixotically, the ultimately tri-
umphant Tigrayans, who liberated Addis Ababa in 1991, professed a Maoism
loyal to Albania, even though they admitted to finding little from this loyalty to
apply to Ethiopia.28 In this Cold War diplomatic chessboard, then, Washington
found itself practically frozen out of the strategic Horn of Africa.
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Dramatic events in Europe, however, brought changes.  The collapse of the
Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 shifted align-
ments worldwide.  Moscow stopped its military assistance to Ethiopia at the end
of 1990, and President Mengistu, in a major speech in March 1990, admitted that
socialism had failed in Ethiopia.  At the end of this year, Mengistu confided to
an American official that he had turned to Moscow only because the United
States had “betrayed it in its greatest need” (when Washington supported
Somalia in the war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region in the 1980s).29 After
pouring $21 billion into Ethiopia over a 17 year period, with such gratitude from
Mengistu, perhaps Moscow was played for a sucker as well.30
These changes also affected the insurgent groups.  In December 1990,
Albania abandoned communism and adopted a multi-party democratic political
system.  The regime in Addis Ababa, having lost is patron in Moscow and feel-
ing that insurgent groups were closing in, cast a vote in the UN Security Council
in support of Washington in its “Desert Storm” campaign against Saddam
Hussein in 1991.  The United States then convened a peace conference on
Ethiopia in London in March 1991.31 At this conference, a US official laid down
what was expected for American support:
Democracy: Everything we do in the Horn should encourage the
adoption of democratic methods and the practice of democracy . . ..
We need also to recognize that authoritarian regimes do a great deal
of damage not only to their economies, but to their societies.32
President Mengistu, however, proved less adaptable than his rivals.  While
acknowledging the failures of his regime, he still protested that “multiparty
democracy has many disadvantages.”33 Washington also remained suspicious at
this conference about the Albanianism of the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front.
But its leader, Meles Zenawi, quickly professed his loyalty to democracy and, as
mentioned, alluringly quoted liberally from Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address.
Mengistu fled the country on 21 May and, with America’s blessing, the TPLF
entered Addis Ababa on 27 May.34
Under the promises of a democracy regained, the aid spigot from
Washington turned back on.  During the years of the Mengistu regime (1977-91),
Ethiopia was one of the lowest recipients of foreign economic aid.  On a per capi-
ta basis in Africa, only fellow-Marxist Mozambique ranked lower.  Immediately
after the fall of the Mengistu regime, the US put together an international aid
package of $672 million.  This was followed by a World Bank package (with the
heavy support of the United States) of $1.2 billion in November 1992.  Before
the Mengistu overthrow, individual US aid for Ethiopia averaged only $50 mil-
lion a year, mainly for disaster relief.  Two-thirds of the funds in these packages
were either from the United States or from organizations largely controlled by
Washington – a huge increase in American assistance.35 With this support and
some reforms of privatization to the economy, some security and economic
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growth returned to Ethiopia.  From an initial 1.7 percent growth after the 1991
revolution, the economy rose to annual growth averages of four percent in the
mid-1990s to six percent by 1999.36
Unfortunately, what was not regained was democracy.  Despite the prom-
ulgation of a democratic constitution that went into effect in 1995 and the hold-
ing of elections in 1992 and 1995, Ethiopia remains a “closed political system.”
The 1992 elections turned into an opportunity for the new regime to hunt down
the rival Oromo Liberation Front.  Elections in 1995 set up a national parliament
with 90 percent of the representatives coming from the ruling party.  Prime
Minister Zenawi and his ruling circle of ethnic Tigrayans closely hold executive
power.  What skews even the trappings of democracy in Ethiopia is that
Tigrayans comprise only 10 percent of the population, while the disenfranchised
Oromos represent 40 to 50 percent.37 Nevertheless, under President Clinton,
Ethiopia rose to the status of the second largest recipient of US aid in sub-
Saharan Africa.38 On his final Africa tour as president in 2000, at a speech in
Addis Ababa, he proclaimed Ethiopia to be a part of “the new Africa.”  In brief,
again, President Clinton proved to be an easy mark for seduction.  
The Pitfall of the Bay of Pigs
In the global struggle of the Cold War, one area that the United States was
determined to keep for its own was its “backyard” in the Caribbean.  Fidel
Castro’s overthrow of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba in a revolutionary campaign in
1958 made Washington nervous.  Though he professed not to be a communist,
Castro’s leftist intellectual leanings were troublesome.  His nationalization of the
sugar plantations and of select American companies was reminiscent of the left-
ist Arbenz regime in Guatemala that the CIA felt compelled to overthrow in
1954.  When Castro accepted Soviet military help in building up his armed
forces, President Eisenhower determined Castro had to go as well, and handed
over a CIA project for Castro’s ouster to his “Cold Warrior” successor, John F.
Kennedy.39 Any lingering doubts on Castro’s loyalties were erased by a report-
ed statement he made on 8 November 1960, just after the American presidential
election, in which he declared, “I have been a Marxist from my student
days…[and that] Moscow is our brain and our great leader.”40
The responsibility for this operation to oust Castro, “Zapata,” fell to
Richard M. Bissell.  Bissell was a self-confident operative in the CIA who was
the architect of the U-2 surveillance program and the mastermind behind the suc-
cessful CIA-led coup d’etat that overthrew the offending Jacobo Arbenz in
Guatemala.41 Bissell was sure he could pull off another Guatemala and keep
communism out of the Western Hemisphere.  The plan was to train a secret
brigade of Cuban exiles operating, nominally, under a Revolutionary Democratic
Front proclaimed in Miami in 1960 (under State Department sponsorship) that
would land in the southern Cuban coastal town of Trinidad, stir up the popula-
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tion, and join guerrilla bands operating in the nearby Escambray Mountains.
Political leaders of the Front would then land in Trinidad and proclaim a provi-
sional government.  The US would quickly demand a ceasefire and usher in
OAS-brokered elections that would send Castro and the communists packing.42
In putting this plan together, some advisers to the president, like William
Bundy, became aware “of Bissell’s reluctance to look at all sides of a question,”
especially of the quaint notion that communist dictatorships might not be
axiomatically unpopular.  This gave the military pause, and in its own assessment
the JCS only gave the plan “a fair chance of ultimate success.”  Civilians took
this as a typically military conservative green light, even though by “fair,” the
JCS meant 30 percent (a percentage expectation the chiefs failed to share with
their civilian counterparts or with the president).43 The top-down perception of
Castro’s weaknesses by the planners gave the plan a seductive allure.  In its own
subsequent internal report of the fiasco, the CIA concluded that the enterprise
was a product of “wishful thinking.”44
These military reservations, however, did make President Kennedy wary.
Among the many failures of the Bay of Pigs, two principal ones stand out – one
a “push” factor and the other a “pull” one.  From a “push” perspective, Kennedy
worried that the Soviet Union might take retaliatory action against the United
States in Berlin, if the US connection to the operation were overt.45
Consequently, he became uniquely adamant that the operation remain covert,
even if it meant abandoning the Cuban brigade on the beaches rather than pro-
viding it with overt American military support.  Tragically, neither the CIA nor
the JCS believed that, in the event, President Kennedy would actually withhold
this support.  He did.  The two parties simply misread each other: “The military
assumed the President would order American intervention.  The President
assumed they knew he would refuse to escalate the miniature war.”46
The “pull” factor was the blithe assumption that the landings would trigger
a popular uprising. The CIA’s main evidence for this was the fact that there were
some 7,000 insurgents in Cuba who were sabotaging the Castro regime with an
impressive list of disruptive acts.  Within Cuba, these insurgents could call on
20,000 sympathizers.  Indeed, the CIA reported that 25 percent of the population
would support a well-armed invading force, and that only a hard-core 5,000-
8,000 members of Castro’s armed forces of over 300,000 would actually fight
this force.  These latter two rosily optimistic figures came from recruits of the
Cuban brigade.47
As late as 4 April, Bissell reassured Kennedy that there would be a popu-
lar revolt.  His proof was the State Department-created Revolutionary
Democratic Front itself.  Bissell portrayed it as representative of the huge mid-
dle spectrum of Cuban society, but its treatment by the CIA only bankrupted this
claim.  The Front was cut off from all contact with the exile brigade because the
members of the Front spent so much time in factional bickering that the Agency
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feared any contact would destroy the unity and combat effectiveness of the
brigade.  The exile leaders, in effect, were reduced to the status of puppets of
their covert American leaders.48 In important political terms, then, this attempt
at bridge leadership was delegitimated from the start.
A poignant illustration of this short shrift given to local political factors lay
in the final selection of the invasion site.  Trinidad was originally selected
because its 18,000 inhabitants cradled a hotbed of anti-Castro sentiment and hun-
dreds of guerrillas operated in the Escambray Mountains just outside of the town.
Kennedy nevertheless overruled this site because he feared it was too public and
risked revealing the American connections of the invaders to the Soviets.
Instead, he picked the more deserted Bay of Pigs, 100 miles away from this
enclave of support in Trinidad.  From the Bay of Pigs, the path to these moun-
tains lay over 80 miles of swamps that also crossed through a hostile rural pop-
ulation.  Castro had made a special point of reaching out to these rural cabaneros
(traditional charcoal makers).  In two years, he had built a hospital, an airport,
three paved highways, and dispatched 200 adult literacy teachers to these
swamplands.  Here invaders were not welcome.49
Not surprisingly, the three-day invasion from 17-20 April 1961 was an epic
disaster.  A “brigade” of 1,500 CIA-trained Cuban exiles landed in two spots in
this bay to confront a local Cuban militia force of 25,000.  Despite these odds,
the exile forces acquitted themselves bravely on the ground.50 By the second
day, however, Castro’s fledgling air force had wrecked havoc with both the men
on the beaches and with their supply ships.  At this critical juncture, Kennedy
refused an urgent CIA and JCS request to allow American air strikes to ease the
pressure and permit the brigade to attempt a breakout to the mountains.  General
Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called this decision
“absolutely reprehensible, almost criminal.”51 With this, the invasion was over.
On 20 April, the brigade surrendered.  Of the 1,518 men in the brigade, 114 were
killed and 1,189 made prisoners.  Only two dozen escaped to US Navy ships.52
For Fidel Castro, the invasion was a gift.  Even as he publicly admitted to
his communism on 16 April, the three-day invasion that followed cemented a
domestic legitimacy to his regime that lasted for the rest of the Cold War.  Indeed,
Che Guevara told a Kennedy aide in August 1961 that it was “a great political
victory” that enabled them to “consolidate their rule” and transform themselves
“from an aggrieved little country into an equal.”53 In brief, Washington was
tempted into an act of folly.  To his speechwriter afterwards, Kennedy provided
his own postmortem: “All my life I’ve known better than to depend on the
experts.  How could I have been so stupid to let them go ahead.”54
Intervention “From the Other End”:  The Primacy of Legitimacy    
In developing a set of refined insights from this view of intervention as
pulled by seduction, a good starting place is James Rosenau’s Linkage Politics.
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Professor Rosenau has long been a careful student of intervention.55 His basic
point about linkage politics is that international politics and domestic politics are
inextricably interconnected.  A military intervention provokes what he terms a
“step linkage,” which has the effect of changing the nature of the rules of poli-
tics in both the intervening and the “host” state.56
These interactive linkages can be spelled out in Figure 1 above, External
Legitimacy Effects.57 In it, an intervention initially will affect the political legit-
imacy of the client regime.  This effect, in turn, will reverse back on the inter-
vening state through both its effect on the intervener’s systemic role in the inter-
national system and, ultimately, on the intervener’s own domestic political legit-
imacy.  Particularly in an insurgency, where an intervention can become pro-
tracted, the politics of the two societies become intertwined.58 A vivid illustra-
tion of this “union” was the heavy American involvement in the assassination of
South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem on 1 November 1963, and the
tremendous impact of the unraveling chaos in Saigon upon the difficult transition
of power to Vice President Lyndon Johnson, when President Kennedy was
gunned down in Dallas just three weeks later.
This figure reflects a presupposition that legitimacy is the central issue of
the struggle between the two sides.  Insurgencies, in brief, are not just struggles
for power; they are struggles for both the purpose of power and the right to
power.  “Purpose” and “right” are conceptions of politics built on the set of prin-
COUNTRY “X“
INTERVENOR
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EXTERNAL LEGITIMACY EFFECTS
COUNTRY “Y“
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Effect #1: Intervention of “X” on Domestic Legitimacy of “Y”
Effect #2: Intervention of “X” in “Y” on its role in International System.
Effect #3: Ultimate effect of “X”’s intervention in “Y” on its own
domesic legitimacy both from the intervention itself and from
the effect of the intervention of its international role.
Figure 1:
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ciples employed in a particular society to justify or legitimate power.  While
legitimacy is a general surplus margin of respect desired by all ruling regimes,
its actual principles are unique or particular to each country.  The point of this
focus on legitimacy for an intervener is that an intervener will have to assess
these principles carefully because they will have a strong effect on the political
prospects of the intervention itself.  From the perspective of a target state’s pol-
itics, a foreign intervention can carry a positive, popular charge – or a negative,
highly resistant charge.
Simply put, this very general deductive concept of legitimacy can have
highly varied political meanings as it is inductively discovered on the ground
country-by-country.  Hence, in countries like Vietnam and China, whose princi-
ples of legitimacy collect around a Mandate of Heaven and a requirement to keep
the land free of foreign devils, ground interventions by foreign troops were like-
ly to harm the legitimacy of the incumbent regime and only hand the insurgents
a patriotic rallying cry.  Yet, in countries like Greece and Malaya, principles of
legitimacy worked strongly in favor of Western interventions:  in Greece because
this global attention was flattering to the Greek sense of national importance in
its megali idea (a harkening back to the grandeur of Byzantium and the classical
Greece that was the cradle of Western civilization), and in Malaya because the
tense inter-communal relations among Malays, Chinese, and Indians depended
on the honest broker role of the British.59 Such a single-minded focus on legiti-
macy as the ground for explaining insurgencies, and interventions in them, has
not been without its critics,60 but it does have the advantage of calling attention
to “pull” explanations rooted in bottom-up political contexts that can expose the
perils of seduction.
The “Perfect Storm” of Seduction in Vietnam
In this discussion of rape, seduction, and legitimacy, Vietnam cannot pass
unnoticed.  It presents, literally, a “perfect storm” of military intervention.
Bundled into this tragedy are all the “push” and “pull” factors of intervention.
With everything in it, it is always summoned for lessons.  More than this, since
it was a searing American failure, it is the ghost that still haunts the American
psyche whenever it steps up to the plate to face Hamlet’s question for every great
power: to intervene or not to intervene? 
Global strategies of containment and flexible response stumbled the
Americans into Vietnam.  China needed to be contained to preserve Southeast
Asian markets and resources for Japan, and Washington needed a laboratory to
brush up on its unconventional war capabilities to demonstrate a full range of
“flexible response” options. As far away as it was in stretching American mili-
tary resources, at first it looked like a tempting cake walk: a seduction of weak-
ness.  After his first trip to South Vietnam in November 1961, Kennedy’s special
military adviser, General Maxwell Taylor, offered this reassurance:
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As far as an area for the operation of U.S. troops, South Vietnam is
not an excessively difficult or unpleasant place to operate . . ..  The
risks of backing into a major war by way of South Vietnam . . . are
not impressive.61
Even when US ground combat troops were fully deployed, the US com-
mander proclaimed a three-phased strategy to bring “victory in three years.”62
Instead, the end of the three years brought the country-wide ambush of the com-
munist Tet Offensive of 1968, and all hopes of bringing the boys “home by
Christmas,” at least on American terms, receded.  As the war bogged down, the
corrosion of the corrupt and authoritarian politics of the Saigon regime ate its
way back to the very politicized streets of America.  The triangle of Figure 1
came full “circle” in Vietnam with the question of legitimacy pulling everyone
down.
As the next section illustrates, once tempted into Vietnam as a felicitous
laboratory for counterinsurgency, the Americans fell into several traps of outright
seduction.  The unwary this time, however, were Washington’s own “best and
brightest,” not foreign exiles who could be abandoned at the beachheads.  The
requirements of overt commitment and global prestige demanded that these “sol-
diers of democracy” keep pummeling the tar baby.
Insights “from the Other End”
As the United States continues to contemplate foreign military interven-
tions in a post-Cold War international system, four insights from the pull per-
spective of seduction can serve as warnings:  the illegitimacy lock, the trap of
“après mois, la deluge,” the sucker play, and the requisite of bridge leadership.
The illegitimacy lock is a negative and mutually reinforcing linkage
between an intervening power and its client regime.  Once an intervening power
has made a policy commitment of intervention in a client state, this client state
will then have made its own domestic politics part of those of the intervening
power.  Thus, to maintain its policy position, the intervening power has to bol-
ster the domestic position of this client regime.  If the domestic legitimacy of this
regime is dubious or contested, there is a strong temptation for the client regime
to rely on the intervener for resources it should properly develop locally.  This is
because the very development of these resources internally will require the
regime to reach out and broaden its political base in ways that dilute its own
domestic power position.  In order to preserve its narrower position, the regime
naturally prefers to let the helpful, but hapless, intervener provide these resources
instead.  If the intervener balks, the client regime will try to convince the inter-
vener that it must support the regime because the alternative is chaos, which will
then destroy the policy of the intervener the intervention is serving.  If the inter-
vener accepts this destiny, or helplessness, the latch on the lock has shut – and
the tail now wags the dog.  It also means that the domestic illegitimacy of the
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regime has become contagious, infecting the legitimacy of the intervention
itself.63
The example of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu (1965-75)
provides a good illustration. Thieu came to power through a military coup
d’état, giving him a narrow, but still exclusive, claim to rule.  The Viet Cong
insurgency was building its political movement on appeals to land reform and a
broader participatory base to national politics.  In order to undercut this move-
ment politically, Thieu needed to promote his own land reform and a more dem-
ocratic political system.  However, since his own putschist path to power lacked
the legitimacy of these more “constitutional” methods, any meaningful set of
reforms, at the very least, would force him to share his power with this broad-
ened political base to national politics.  Thieu’s own narrow political interests
were better served by avoiding all this and letting the Americans step in and pros-
ecute the counterinsurgency more vigorously.  Unfortunately, this only com-
pounded Thieu’s legitimacy problem, just as it made the Americans an integral
part of his illegitimacy.  At this point, the lock was complete. With the lock in
place, Thieu could count on the Americans to bail him out.  When the Tet
Offensive broke out in January 1968, for example, Thieu at first panicked
because he thought it was a coup attempt by one of his military rivals.  When he
realized that it was just a massive, all-out communist bid for power, he was
immensely relieved.  Not to worry, the Americans would take care of the com-
munists.  A coup he would have had to deal with on his own.64
A pernicious variant or supplement to the illegitimacy lock is the phenom-
enon of “après mois, la deluge.”  After an illegitimacy lock has become pro-
tracted, it becomes addictive.  That is, the client regime may come to fully real-
ize that ultimately the only way out of this impasse of illegitimacy is to serious-
ly undertake the reforms that would staunch the flow of leaking legitimacy.  The
problem, of course, lies in the fact that these reforms may well rip out the props
of the regime’s power.  Hence, the client will constantly step back from taking
the plunge of reform and revert to the opium of the intervener’s money, infra-
structure support, and army.  Thus:
Put from the perspective of the ruling clique:  to win an insurgency
is to lose because it will result in a call for broad-based civilian rule.
More pragmatic victory lies in losing imperceptibly and staving off
the  ultimate reckoning with a circumspect, respectful intervention.
Obviously, it is a program for survival built on a fraud because when
the foreign help is withdrawn, the deck of cards collapses.65
Such a saga of “après mois, la deluge” was the long dependence of China’s
Chiang Kaishek on the Americans.  In fact, Chiang lacked the decency to die
when he lost to Mao Zedong’s guerrillas in 1949, but managed to entice the
Americans into continuing his habit of dependence when he set up his second
client regime on Taiwan.
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The most vicious of all seductions, however, is the sucker play.  This
occurs when one of the political forces on the ground in the client state entices a
great power into an intervention in order to exploit this intervention for its own
partisan advantage, an advantage that can turn treacherously against the interests
of the intervening great power.  Although risky for the local force, such a ploy
can offer dramatic pay-offs.  When a schoolboy begins to bear a losing image on
the playground, what better way to regain his position than to challenge the bully
to a fight?  Though the inevitable bloody nose will smart, the reestablished
respect will provide an exhilarating salve.  
Such a salve came to Mohammed Farrah Aideed in Somalia, who was a
leader of one of 12 feuding warlord clans fighting among themselves to succeed
Mohammed Siad Barre following his ouster from power in 1989-90.  Despite his
military strength, politically, by 1992, Aideed began to find himself in a losing
position in national politics, even though he had carved out a zone of control in
the southern part of the capital city of Mogadishu.  In the anarchy and ensuing
mass starvation of that year, Aideed reluctantly consented to a US-led interven-
tion.  Nevertheless, the immediate effect of the intervention was to keep every-
one in place, fortuitously preserving Aideed’s position in Mogadishu.66
When the US succumbed to “mission creep,” and moved against the “war-
lords,” Aideed turned on US forces.  In a bold “sucker play,” he made himself
something of a national hero against the “world’s remaining superpower” when
his forces ambushed elite US army rangers in a battle on 3 October 1993 that left
18 American soldiers dead in the streets of Mogadishu.  The Clinton administra-
tion’s announcement of a US withdrawal by March of the next year only con-
firmed the success of Aideed’s gamble.67
The way that Osama bin Laden’s blows on 11 September can be seen as a
sucker play is to understand that the United States is not his primary target, but
a means to an end.  Like all radical Muslims, in all his pronouncements the objec-
tive of bin Laden and of his organization is to take up “the neglected duty” of the
restoration of the Muslim Empire.  The barrier to his dream is not so much the
United States as it is the moderate regimes of the major power centers of Islam:
Egypt, his native Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, Pakistan, and
Indonesia.  The problem to him is that the destinies of these regimes are too
closely linked with the West.  The purpose of this dramatic attack on the United
States, then, is to provoke such massive retaliation by the Americans that the
faithful in the “Arab streets” will be so enraged that they will not only fight
against the United States but overthrow their moderate rulers as well.  In this
light, an American invasion of Iraq might prove to be just the incendiary trigger
for the fulfillment of the fondest dreams of Osama bin Laden.68
Finally, one of the most important insights emanating from a bottom-up
context is the necessity for an intervention to either find, or desperately build,
bridge leadership.  If a client regime is to have any prayer of standing on its own
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and building an independent claim to national legitimacy, it must have a leader-
ship capable of building bridges to the middle center of national politics.
Typically, insurgencies arise out of a dumbbell model or image of a right-wing
incumbent regime facing off against a left-wing insurgent group.  With both par-
ties starting from a political periphery, victory, at least in political terms, lies with
whoever captures the middle bar of the dumbbell.69
The hazards of ignoring the prerequisite of bridge leadership, or at least
possibilities of it, are demonstrated by the dilemma posed by South Vietnamese
President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 and Saddam Hussein today.  However auto-
cratic Diem’s regime had become by the fall of that year, Diem did retain foun-
dations in the middle ground of civilian politics.  By supporting his ouster, the
United States very nearly destroyed its own intervention as the subsequent mili-
tary regimes lost all claim to this middle ground. The war against the commu-
nists continued thereafter almost exclusively on American shoulders.  This put
the fate of the Vietnamese too much in the hands of domestic American politics,
and this support failed to go the distance.  In President Clinton explicitly calling
for the ouster of Saddam Hussein as part of his “Christmas bombing” of Iraq in
1998 (which he called OPERATION DESERT FOX), it is doubtful that much
attention was paid to identifying any alternative bridge leadership in Iraq.
Similarly, in all of President George W. Bush’s further and recent calls for
“regime change” in Iraq, there has been no mention of the political forces in Iraq
who would shoulder this burden.
“Insightful” Questions to Ponder
All interventions will certainly have to undergo initial discussions over the
policy merits of their anticipated benefits to the foreign policy goals of interven-
ing powers.  Hence, “push” calculations of interventions do have à priori valid-
ity.  As this article has tried to show, however, such calculations are not enough
to avoid the pitfalls of seduction that may await intervening powers.  Hopefully,
I have made it clear that insights from the “pull” level of local contexts are por-
tentous enough to create disasters of Syracuse for the unwary.
From the insights of seduction in this article, policy makers would do well
to factor into their deliberations the following set of questions:
First, regarding the illegitimacy lock, and how to avoid it, what are the
strengths of the legitimacy claims of the competing factions in the target state,
and especially of the faction contemplated as the client?
Second, as for the trap of  “après mois, la deluge,” what are the narrow
self-interests of the prospective client, and how can the larger national interests
be kept paramount in the intervention?
Third, on the dangers of a sucker play, once on the ground with forces of
intervention, which parties, even friendly ones, would stand to make political
profit from dealing these forces an unsuspecting blow?
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Finally, concerning the critical legitimating factor of bridge leadership,
where in the target state’s political spectrum does a proposed client’s support lie?
If it is a distance from the center, what are the opportunities for, and obstacles to,
moving the client to this center?
While most interventions are driven by “push” factors, I submit that their
success cannot be assured unless positive answers can be developed to these four
questions drawn from the “pull” factors of seduction.  I have seen no evidence of
such positive answers for any campaign to overthrow Saddam Hussein in Iraq.
As the 78-day NATO air campaign over Kosovo demonstrated: while new tech-
nologies may make interventions easy in the getting in, with the razzle-dazzle of
“virtual war” from the air, once on the ground, the local politics can mire these
intervening forces in wars of politics without end.  What won’t end are the polit-
ical questions of the illegitimacy locks, the parochial self-interests of local lead-
ers, the dangers of their sucker plays, and the often futile quest for the elusive
chimera of bridge leadership.  It is these questions emanating “from the other
end” of intervention – the “pull” end – that need to be considered before the
“push” side of high-minded global policy gains too much momentum to see these
perils of seduction.70
EPILOGUE
In this momentum in the United States to oust Saddam Hussein, the Bush
administration is laboring hard to prepare the groundwork for an intervention –
at the United Nations, among both NATO allies and friendly states in the Middle
East, in the corridors of the US Congress, and on the TV talk shows to raise the
paeans of war to the chattering class.  While the American opinion poll numbers
rise in support of this war, there remains one detail, as the Wall Street Journal
has acknowledged, “But how Iraq’s population would react to a U.S. invasion
remains a wild card.”71 It was this same wild card at the Bay of Pigs that forced
a profession of stupidity from President Kennedy.  We need no further such pro-
fessions over Baghdad.
There are, of course, instances in which “push” factors of international
threats and looming de-stabilizations of balances of power compel interventions
by great powers.  Such was the case in Cuba, a year after the Bay of Pigs, when
the Soviet Union was caught installing nuclear missiles on this island nation
capable of reaching the eastern United States in five minutes.  Analogously, the
question that this article commends to all Americans, and to their allies, as a
final check for an intervention is: with respect to Iraq in 2002, which Cuba is the
right analogy – the “pull” of pigs in 1961 or the “push” of missiles in 1962?
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